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Most Americans have a jaundiced view of Congress. In the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the proportion of 
Americans who perceive Congress as “corrupt” has risen, with 52% believing 
that most members of Congress are corrupt and a record 32% believing that 
their own member of Congress is corrupt.2 According to a 2015 Bloomberg 
News survey, 78% of Americans believe that Citizens United, which helped to 
unleash the boundless wallets of corporations and the wealthy to fund Super 
PACs and anonymous conduits in elections, should be overturned.3 The 
public’s distaste for the high court’s handiwork crosses partisan lines even in 
an era of über-partisan polarization. Republicans oppose the decision 80% to 
18%, Democrats oppose it 83% to 13%, and independents 71% to 22%.4 
One could not have predicted such a resounding rejection of Citizens 
United based on the self-assured, if unsupported, proclamations in Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion. Among Kennedy’s vatic pronouncements was 
this one: 
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate  
to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is 
political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a 
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candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to 
spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the 
ultimate influence over elected officials.5 
The quick, six-year pedigree of Citizens United has revealed the folly of 
Justice Kennedy’s prediction. Moreover, at the time of its decision, there was 
before the Court, and in any case within grasp of its judicial notice, sufficient 
evidence that money in the political process was breeding mass political 
cynicism. In short, the vision of democracy conjectured by the Court’s five 
conservative Justices had already been rejected by the American public and 
stood no chance of approbation going forward. 
That vision is aptly described as dystopia, even as Justice Kennedy wrapped 
it in the purity of the First Amendment. Dystopia is a society characterized by 
unpleasantness, even misery. If the figures concerning corruption do not 
sufficiently convey the dystopian state of American politics, consider two 
closely related statistics: 79% of Americans believe that Congress is “out of 
touch with average Americans,” and 69% believe that Congress “focuse[s] on 
the needs of ‘special interests’ rather than the needs of [its] constituents.”6 
These figures reflect the distorting impact of big money in politics, and the 
resulting skew of policy outcomes in favor of the donor class. 
Oddly, though, Justice Kennedy may not be moved by the latter findings 
even if known to him. This is due to Kennedy’s narrowing of the 
government’s interest in preventing “corruption.” Citing to only his own 
partial dissent from a prior case, Kennedy opined for the majority in Citizens 
United that “[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”7 Kennedy then 
quoted himself: 
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is 
in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by 
necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those 
policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not 
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate 
over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political 
outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.8 
There’s a reason Justice Kennedy was forced into the terrarium of self-citation 
for his views on favoritism: prior to Citizens United, they had not commanded 
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a majority. To accede to such views is to endorse the locus of the public’s 
dystopian perception of politics—too much focus on special interests at the 
expense of everyone else. 
Justice Kennedy assumes without support that representatives organically 
hold political views on the myriad, often esoteric issues on which they  
must vote, and that these views attract donors, rather than donors helping to 
shape the candidate’s views. This naïve preconception is ironically utopian 
with dystopian consequences.9 Furthermore, it is a non sequitur to say that 
favoritism and influence are unavoidable while at the same time hamstringing 
Congress’s ability to curtail these gateways to corruption. And if the point  
of making a contribution is, as Kennedy puts it, to have the supported 
candidate “respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter 
favors,”10 there appears to be little point in our bribery laws—in fact, they, 
too, may be unconstitutional.11 
Consider how Justice Kennedy’s unavoidability argument enables the 
conduct of Congressman Bill Shuster, the Chairman of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. According to OpenSecrets.org, 
one of the top ten contributors to Shuster’s campaign during the 2014 cycle 
was Airlines for America (A4A), a leading airlines trade association.12 It also 
happens that the vice president of A4A is Shuster’s girlfriend.13 Although 
Shuster insists that his girlfriend does not lobby his office, it is clear that the 
president of A4A, Nick Calio, does. Calio testified before Shuster’s 
committee in favor of a bill that would place air traffic control authority in 
the hands of a private nonprofit company instead of the Federal Aviation 
Administration.14 After the bill cleared Shuster’s committee, he, Calio and 
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Shuster’s girlfriend spent the weekend on Miami Beach attending a 
Republican fundraising retreat.15 
What’s wrong with this picture? Apparently nothing if you’re Justice 
Kennedy. It’s a tale of (unavoidable) access and favoritism. Yet it must be 
distasteful even for Justice Kennedy. As the Shuster imbroglio illustrates, 
things were already bad enough with direct contributions to candidates 
through corporate PACs like A4A, which are created from funds separate and 
apart from corporations’ general treasuries. Citizens United holds that 
Congress cannot seek to curtail the inevitable public cynicism engendered by 
Shuster’s and A4A’s unseemly conduct—to say nothing of the gateways to 
actual bribery—by enforcing a decades-old ban on the use of corporate and 
union general treasuries in candidate elections.16 It is one thing to believe that 
certain behaviors are inevitable; it is quite another for the Court to rule in a 
way that actually expands the spectrum of the undesirable conduct. 
Justice Kennedy’s answer to the charge of exacerbation rests on the fiction 
that Super PACs—to which corporations and wealthy individuals are now 
allowed to give unlimited contributions—do not demoralize the average 
citizen’s faith in democracy because “[b]y definition, an independent 
expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not 
coordinated with a candidate.”17 Here, Kennedy conveys a jejune 
understanding of political coordination to which neither the average citizen 
nor the average politician would cosign. When candidates can fundraise for 
their very own Super PAC,18 or can signal to a Super PAC which ads to run 
and which to stop,19 it reflects a state of denial to claim the absence of 
coordination, and it is likewise willful blindness to claim the absence of 
indebtedness by the politician to her Super PAC donors. 
Juxtapose the qualifications of Justice Kennedy to opine on the effects of 
large campaign contributions or any other practical aspect of campaign finance 
with, say, those of Donald Trump, the presumptive 2016 Republican 
presidential nominee who, himself, has given large campaign contributions to 
politicians of both parties. Trump has boasted: 
      I gave to many people. Before this, before two months ago, I was a 
businessman. I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And you know 
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what? When I need something from them, two years later, three years later, 
I call them. They are there for me. And that’s a broken system.20 
Let’s dismiss Trump as a braying solipsist. There remains the sweeping 
record from McConnell v. FEC, in which “lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy 
individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft 
money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express 
purpose of securing influence over federal officials.”21 It would have been an 
act of judicial modesty—and prudence—for Justice Kennedy to concede that 
the Court in Citizens United knew far less about the corrupting and distorting 
effects of money—whether in the form of large donations or nominally 
independent expenditures—than the donors and members of our democratic 
branches of government who actually traffic in campaign money. The Court’s 
failure to reckon with its epistemic limitations in Citizens United has greatly 
contributed to the potential for democratic dystopia. 
As if Citizens United’s factual assumptions were not fallacious enough, the 
majority embraces the novel legal theory that the First Amendment precludes 
the government from acting to rein in “Shusterism” or to prevent its 
expansion into areas of Super PACs, anonymous-moneyed 501(c)(4) 
organizations, or whatever the next new frontier for evading contribution 
limits may be. Subsequent to Citizens United, however, the Court rejected a 
First Amendment challenge to a state recusal provision that disallowed an 
elected official from voting on or advocating in relation to legislation where 
his independent judgment could foreseeably be impaired by a financial 
conflict of interest.22 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Nevada 
Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, found that conflict of interest recusal 
statutes were too ingrained in the historical fabric of the nation to be 
considered an unconstitutional infringement on speech.23 This holding was 
of a piece with the Court’s earlier decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal 
Co., in which the Court held that a $3 million campaign contribution to a 
jurist who would be part of a panel hearing the contributor’s case posed the 
risk of actual bias, and thus, under the Due Process Clause, required recusal 
of the judge.24 
 The Court’s holdings in Carrington and Caperton reflect a realist view of 
the imperative that politicians and judges alike should not be influenced by 
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either personal pecuniary interests or campaign contributions.25 It makes 
little sense, however, for the Court to treat recusal from conflicts of interest 
differently than the government’s efforts to prevent the creation of the conflict 
in the first place.26 The prohibition on the use of corporate and union general 
treasuries invalidated in Citizens United, like many other campaign finance 
restrictions, is directed to the same basic purpose as conflict of interest recusal 
laws: fostering a deliberative decisionmaking process undistorted by the 
kinds of biases that pecuniary interests tend to induce. Until the Supreme 
Court can connect these dots, Justice Kennedy’s democratic dystopia will 
burden the nation for the foreseeable future.  
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